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Abstract 
 
Based on a review of the literature and on interviews of different local stakeholders, this paper 
assesses the efficiency of the Costa Rican Payment for Environmental Services Program 
(PESP) as a conservation tool focusing on its main modality: the forest protection one. The 
PESP has had a low direct impact on the forest cover of the country but may have had an 
important indirect impact as it served as compensation for the prohibition of forested land uses 
change. Furthermore, the PESP appears to have a better impact at a lower cost than the 
protected area network, the main alternative as a conservation tool. The PESP appeared also 
quite competitive from the point of view of its costs before the institutional transformation that 
occurs in 2008. A significant potential for improvement of the PESP efficiency exists on the 
short term but may affect its legitimacy and impact the social norms and values dealing with 
conservation in a way that could jeopardize the program effects on the long term. 
 
Keywords: payment for environmental services, impact assessment, Costa Rica, forest 
protection, institutions  
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Introduction 
 
 
Ecosystems services provide valuable services to local, regional and international communities 
(Costanza et al., 1997; Millenium Ecosystem Assesment (MEA), 2005). However, traditional 
markets are under developed or lacking for many environmental services (ES) such as watershed 
benefits, biodiversity, and carbon sequestration. Over the past decades, “Payments for 
Environmental Services” (PES) (also called ecosystem or ecological services) have received a 
great deal of attention as a natural-resource management approach (Landell-Mills and Porras, 
2002; Corbera et al., 2007; Engel et al., 2008; Wunder et al., 2008; Pattanayak et al., 2010). 
Wunder (2005, 2007) defines PES as voluntary transactions where a well-defined environmental 
service (ES) (or a land-use likely to secure that service) is being ‘bought’ by a minimum of one 
ES buyer from a minimum of one ES provider if and only if the ES provider secures ES 
provision during a determined time (conditionality). Pure PES approaches fulfilling all the 
criteria of Wunder’s definition may not always be possible, or even preferable (Wunder, 2005; 
Corbera et al., 2007). Sommerville et al. (2009) consider PES as an umbrella term for a set of 
resource-management tools that aim to transfer positive incentives to ES providers that are 
conditional on the provision of the service, where successful implementation is based on a 
consideration of (1) additionality1 and (2) varying institutional contexts.  
 
Our contribution will focus on the case of Costa Rica to shed light on the debates over the 
assessment of PES. In Costa Rica, the PES program (PESP)2 has been instituted in 1996 by the 
Forest Law 7575 and recognizes four ES provided by forest ecosystem: biodiversity, watershed 
function, scenic beauty and greenhouse gas mitigation through carbon storage and sequestration. 
                                                 
1 For a PES scheme, additionality consists in paying for the adoption of practices that would not have been 
adopted in the absence of payment (Engel et al., 2008). 
2 Programa de Pago por Servicios Ambientales (PSA program). 
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This program is part of a 20 years-long process of forest policy evolution (Daniels et al., 2010) 
and appears undeniably as a precursor and a model in the developing world (Pagiola et al., 
2002). The National Forestry Financing Fund (FONAFIFO), the trust fund in charge of the 
PESP management, buys to landowners the environmental services generated by some defined 
land uses, mainly forest ones.  Landholders may participate through several land use modalities 
which currently include (1) reforestation through plantations (which dates from Forest Law to 
present), (2) protection of existing forests (which dates from Forest Law to present), (3) natural 
forest regeneration (which dates from first mention in 2005 to present), (4) agroforestry systems 
(which dates from 2003 to present), (5) forest management (which has been instituted by Forest 
Law, removed from the PESP in 2002 and reintroduced in 2010). After more than two hundred 
million cumulative dollars invested3 (FONAFIFO, 20104), fifteen years of experience and 
over 700,000 ha of forest contracted in the program (some 13% of the national territory), we 
attempt to answer the question “what is the efficiency of the PESP as a conservation tool?” 
 
An extensive and dynamic literature exists about Costa Rica’s PES (Pagiola, 2008; Pagiola et al. 
2002; Zbinden and Lee, 2005; Daniels et al., 2010, etc.) but relatively few studies have taken 
into account the institutional nature of the Costa Rican PESP in their understandings of its 
performance. Our objective is to review PES impact studies in Costa Rica and to supplement 
these by some findings based on interviews carried out in 2009 and 20105 that shed lights on the 
institutional nature of the program. Our study focuses on the forest protection modality (PESP-
Protection), by far the most important of the PESP6. We begin with an analysis of the 
                                                 
3 These payments come mainly from a tax on fuel but also from international donors as loans or donations (World 
Bank, Global Environmental Fund, GTZ) and from the national private sector. 
4 This reference corresponds to datas available on Fonafifo website : 
http://www.fonafifo.go.cr/paginas_espanol/servicios_ambientales/sa_estadisticas.htm 
5 We have conducted interviews of different actors involved in the design, implementation and evolution of the 
program such as: civil servants, researchers, representatives of the private sector, of forestry organizations. 
6 This modality concentrates most of the area contracted in the framework of the PESP: about 90% between 1997 
and 2008.  
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environmental effectiveness of the Costa Rican PESP. Then we give an overview of its costs. 
Finally we highlight some important implications of the potential improvement of the PESP 
efficiency. 
 
1. The environmental effectiveness of the Costa Rican PESP  
 
We analyze the environmental effectiveness of Costa Rican PESP in three stages: we first study 
to what extent the PESP has really contributed to the extension of forest cover, then we analyze 
if the PESP has generated the expected ES, and finally we conclude with an evaluation of the 
sustainability of PESP environmental outcomes.   
 
1.1. The impact on forest cover 
 
We assess on the one hand to what extent the PESP beneficiaries have really implemented the 
agreed (forest) land uses, and, on the other hand, if these land uses would have been adopted 
anyway in the absence of the PESP (additionality).  
 
On the first issue, Pagiola (2008) says that « the PSA program has established a strong system 
to monitor land user compliance with payment contracts». This monitoring is made easier by 
the uploading on the GPS of the maps of the farms under contract, and is carried out through 
field visits, forest covers studies through Landsat 7 (since the mid 2000s) and aerial 
photographies. Non compliance results in the cancelling of the contracts and the refund of the 
payments7.  
 
                                                 
7 This ensures that, on the whole, only the landowners who did implement the desired land uses, benefit from the 
payments. However, no data is available about the percentage of PESP beneficiaries that didn’t comply with 
payment contracts and had to refund the payments received. 
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Regarding the second issue, the importance of the scale of the PESP and the success of the 
country in reversing the deforestation trend8 make it tempting to establish a causal link between 
the PESP and the reduction of deforestation. However, the outcomes obtained in terms of 
environmental effectiveness can be discussed for several reasons.  
 
First, Pagiola (2008) notices that it is difficult to isolate the effects of PESP of those induced by 
others environmental policies and of the economic context. Indeed, the PESP has been 
instituted along with the prohibition of deforestation9, for which it represents in some ways 
compensation. As this measure has allowed reducing deforestation and as it has been made 
acceptable and thus possible by the PESP, this program can claim to have contributed indirectly 
to reduce deforestation (Pfaff et al., 2006).  Nevertheless, the protected areas system (Sanchez-
Azofeifa, 2007), the fall of the profitability of livestock farming reducing the incentive to 
convert forests in pastures, in particular in isolated areas (Pagiola, 2008), the development of 
ecotourism (Rojas and Aylward, 2003) and the increase in emigration (Kull et al., 2007) have 
also contributed to reduce deforestation. Furthermore, the trend of increasing forest cover dates 
from the early 1990s that is to say before the launching of the PESP (Wunder, 2007). 
 
Moreover, several studies show that many beneficiaries of the PESP say that they would have 
protected the forest if the PESP-Protection did not exist, which characterizes a low additionality 
of the program (Miranda et al., 2003; Ortiz et al., 2003). Based on the beneficiaries’ 
declarations, Ortiz et al. (2003) argue that the additionnality of the program may range from 
22% to 27% of the areas contracted at the national level, while Morse et al. (2009) found a 
higher effect in the North Caribean plain ranging from 40% to 50%.  
                                                 
8 The forest cover which represented 42% of the territory in 1997, has reached 48% in 2005 (Fonafifo, 2007). 
9 The Forest Law 7575 says in its article 19 that « On the lands covered with forest, changing land uses will not be 
allowed ». 
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Thirdly, formal tests to assess the impact of the PESP-Protection on forest cover give 
contradictory results, depending on the methodologies adopted and their ability to treat 
methodological challenges10. Robalino et al. (2008) consider that between 2000 and 2005, the 
PESP has allowed to reduce deforestation in 0.4% of the area contracted each year, a result 
higher than what Pfaff et al. (2007) have found for the 1997 to 2000 period: less than 0.2%. 
Robalino et al. (2008) attribute this slight improvement at a better targeting11 of the program 
and at an increase of the risk of deforestation at the national level from 0.2% to 0.3%. Using an 
econometric model of gross deforestation, Tattenbach et al. (2006) estimate the proportion of 
the area under PESP-Protection for which deforestation have been avoided to be 38% during 
the 1996-2000 period in the Central Volcanic Cordillera Conservation Area. Studying an area 
including the San Juan – La Selva biological corridor in northern Costa Rica, Morse et al. 
(2009) found also that while deforestation occurred mostly inside the corridor during the 1986-
1996 period, 93% of the natural forest patches cleared during the 1996-2001 period were 
outside of the corridor to which the PES had been targeted. This may be due to the high level of 
spatial targeting of the program in this region (Daniels et al., 2010), suggesting the addionality 
of the program could improve at the national level with the attempt to improve the spatial 
targeting. In their survey in the Osa region, Sierra and Russman (2006) conclude that the PESP 
has not allowed to reduce deforestation between 1997 and 2003 but has contributed to the 
increase of forest cover by favouring natural forest regeneration on non-contracted land. 
Indeed, the PES funding have been used by landowners as a financial capital to engage in non-
                                                 
10 According to Daniels et al. (2010), difficulties to assess the impact of the PESP on forest cover are particularly 
strong for the first years of the PESP and lie on three interrelated themes: spatial data considerations, sampling 
considerations and the effects of institutional path dependency. 
11 While the Costa Rican PESP did not initially prioritize applications to the program, some criterias have been 
defined since 1999 in order to target the most important lands for ES provision and also to fight against poverty. 
Priority areas for the protection modality corresponded in 2009 to the « conservation blanks », the lands in wildlife 
protected areas, the lands in biological corridors, the indigenous territories, the districts with a low index of social 
development. 
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agricultural productive activities making it easier to abandon agriculture, thus allowing the 
natural regeneration of forests through the conversion in “bush” of the lands to happen sooner. 
Daniels et al. (2010) underline this result and suggest that this could have been the case also in 
the North Caribbean plain, after having interpreted datas of Morse et al. (2009).  
 
Fourth, according to Pagiola (2008), the fact that the PESP has a long awaiting list of people 
wishing to participate in the program suggests that deforestation is not very profitable in many 
areas. In fact, participation to the PESP is voluntary, and the landowners choose to participate 
or not to the program, which can lead to integrate lands whose conservation implies the lowest 
opportunity costs and whose deforestation risks are the lowest, characterizing a problem of 
anti-selection (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al., 2007). Several studies (Hartshorn et al., 2005; Ortiz et 
al., 2003) underline the poverty of the soils of the lands enrolled in the program: as about three 
quarters of the area under PES schemes have soils that don’t allow an agricultural use, these 
lands would probably have not been converted to non forest uses (pastures, agriculture or 
others) if the PESP did not exist.   
 
Additionality of the PESP seems low and variable according to regions, but has globally 
increased overtime. Nevertheless, it must have been higher than for the other main conservation 
tool: the protected areas network. Indeed, Pfaff et al. (2008) found that during the 1986-1996 
period, when deforestation rate was higher than during the PESP implementation period, the 
protected areas network have saved 2% of the forest area it covers, that is to say some 0.2% per 
year. 
 
It is worth reminding that additionality has never been set as an objective of the program 
(Pagiola, 2008). The PESP does not target participants on the basis of the deforestation risk but 
  
11 
rather on the basis of the areas’ potential in terms of ES generation and fight against poverty. 
Its philosophy is «to ‘recognize’ the environmental services of whoever is providing them » 
(Pagiola, 2008).  
 
1.2. The impacts on the generation of environmental services 
 
According to Pagiola (2008), « It is unfortunately impossible to determine the extent to which 
the PSA program has successfully generated environmental services [...] the program remains 
weak in monitoring its effectiveness in generating the desired services ». The impact of land 
uses promoted by the PESP on the hydrological and biodiversity conservation services will be 
carried out in the future on pilot projects in the framework of the MMBIEM project12. 
However, while the ES generated by the program have not been yet measured directly, the 
potential of ES generation can be estimated indirectly through the analysis of the characteristics 
of the PESP areas of intervention. The actual ES generation depends on the additionality of the 
program. 
 
The PESP-Protection impact in terms of hydrological services seems weak. Until now, the 
PESP has been largely13 focused on the areas where few hydrological services were likely to be 
generated and a relatively low number of important areas from a hydrological point of view has 
been incorporated to the PESP (Pagiola, 2008). In addition, the idea that forest land uses 
promoted by the PESP would improve the hydrological services is based upon a belief very 
rooted in Costa Rica and in the rest of Central America that the forest are always beneficial to 
                                                 
12 The « Mainstreaming Market Based Instruments for Environmental Management » project (commonly called 
Ecomarkets II) is a 80 millions US$ project from the Global Environment Facility, the World Bank and the 
Governement of Costa Rica supporting the development of the PESP during the 2007-2012 period (World Bank, 
2006). 
13 In 65% of the cases according to Tattenbach et al. (2006). 
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hydrological services (Pagiola, 2002) while this link is in fact not well established 
scientifically14 (Pagiola, 2008; Bishop and Landell-Mills, 2002). Nevertheless, in Costa Rica, 
the main concern is about water quality for which the link with forest cover is better established 
(Pagiola, 2008). Finally, two evolutions of the program should allow the improvement of 
hydrological services generation. The introduction of the water tariff as a mean of funding the 
PESP should improve the targeting of the important areas from a hydrological point of view as 
the decree establishing it mentions that the resources it generates should be spent at the level of 
the same watershed (Pagiola, 2008). Moreover, the hydrological importance has been 
established as a targeting criterion since 2009.   
 
The PESP impact in terms of biodiversity conservation can be estimated by analysing to what 
extent the lands enrolled in the PESP are located in priority areas for biodiversity conservation. 
These priority areas have been identified at the national level in 1996 by the GRUAS study, a 
proposal of land uses planning for biodiversity conservation that served as a basis for the 
definition of PESP priority areas. In 2003, a broader definition of these areas includes the 
priority biological corridors identified by the Ecomarkets project and the National System of 
Conservation Areas (SINAC). In 2005, some two thirds of the active contracts correspond to 
priority areas for biodiversity conservation according to the broader GRUAS definition15 
(Pagiola, 2008; Tattenbach et al., 2006; Hartshorn et al., 2005), which seems to be a good 
performance, although the assessment of the Ecomarkets project (Hartshorn et al., 2005) 
considers that PESP areas of intervention are too scattered.  
 
                                                 
14 Especially regarding the link between forest cover and water volume or the availability of water during the dry 
season. 
15 The proportion of contracts corresponding to these priority areas has increased since 2003 due to the efforts of  
FONAFIFO  since it took on the responsibility of the application process instead of the SINAC. The proportion of 
new PES contracts in the GRUAS areas and the priority biological corridors was lower than 48% between 1999 
and 2002 and was higher than 60% between 2003 and 2005 (Pagiola, 2008). 
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The potential amount of carbon maintained in forest due to the PESP depends on the type of 
forest ecosystem protected by the program: tropical humid forest countain more carbon than 
dry forests for example. While there is no data available on this issue, the areas involved in the 
PESP seem to correspond to the diversity of the Costa-Rican forests which store on the whole 
an important amount of carbon. 
 
Altogether, while the generation of ES depends actually of the additionality of the PESP, the 
areas involved in the program are important for biodiversity conservation but not for 
hydrological services generation and do represent an important carbon sequestration and 
storage potential. No study has been carried on to assess specifically the scenic beauty of the 
areas contracted under the PESP. 
 
 
1.3. The sustainability of the PESP environmental impacts  
 
From a contractual point of view and in the case of contracts for forest protection, there is no 
expectative of sustainability apart from the renewing of the contracts16, which is what 
FONAFIFO tries to do to the extent of the available resources, except for the contracts 
concerning non priority areas (Pagiola, 2008).  
 
The most important factor of the sustainability of the program is its financing. From this point 
of view, the dependency of the PESP on the tax on fuel is worrying as pressures could be 
exercised to reduce it in the future, for example in the case of an important increase in energy 
price.  Individual contracts with ES users (hydropower companies, breweries...) are a source of 
                                                 
16 As we have already mentionned, deforestation is forbidden, which allows to some extent the sustainability of 
forest protection.  
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sustainability of the program and their renewing is encouraging but they only represent a small 
part of the funding: 2.5% of the funds distributed between 1997 and 2010 (FONAFIFO, 2010). 
The implementation of the water tariff is encouraging as it should generate, once it is 
completely implemented, 5 millions US$ per year (Pagiola, 2008). FONAFIFO hopes also that 
the carbon sales on the international market could generate some 1 million US$ from 2012. In 
2007, a sale of 0.61 million of tons equivalent CO2 to the World Bank’s Biocarbon Fund has 
already been carried on (Pagiola, 2008). The funding of the PESP for biodiversity conservation 
purpose becomes an important issue to complete the fundings obtained owing to carbon storage 
and water services which remain limited. In this view, FONAFIFO has created a trust fund, the 
« Fund for Sustainable Biodiversity17 » that has received an initial grant from the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) of 8 millions US$ in the framework of the MMBIEM project and 
is expected to receive others grants and incomes from the sale of conservation certificates on 
the voluntary market18 (Pagiola, 2008). It is still too early to assess the success of these funds to 
ensure a sufficient and sustainable funding for biodiversity conservation.  
 
Beyond the established contractual obligations, PESP effects on the long run can also be 
assessed looking at its capacity to make social norms and values regarding forest conservation 
evolve. This aspect has been little studied until now and there is no consensus about it. 
Hartshorn et al. (2005) say that « PSA contracts may contribute to environmental protection 
indirectly by making the social norms and preferences of the participants more conservation-
oriented », thanks in particular to the institutionalization of the recognition of ES value. This 
perception change of forest ecosystems has been noticed by several studies (Locatelli et al., 
2008; Miranda et al., 2003; Ortiz et al., 2003) but none of them have used a test group 
                                                 
17 “Fondo para la Biodiversidad Sostenible”. 
18 The MMBIEM projet foresees a funding of 8,1 millions US$ from the Governement of Costa Rica and of 0,4 
million for the sale of carbon credit (World Bank, 2006). 
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constituted of non-participants to the PESP in order to isolate the effects of the PESP. 
According to Ortiz et al. (2003), 95% of the beneficiaries of the interviewed think that the 
program (PESP-Protection) has taught the people to value the forest and 93% think that thanks 
to PESP, landowners are more concerned than before the program about the maintenance of 
forest, water, fauna and flora. The PESP does not explicitly provide conservation education 
materials to participants but some organizations that serve as intermediaries in the framework 
of the PESP have played a key role in spreading environmental information and education.  
 
 
 
2. The costs of the Costa Rican PESP  
 
In order to assess the performance of the program from the point of view of its costs, we first 
study the level of the transaction costs, then the level of the payments, before comparing the 
overall costs of the PESP to those of the implementation of protected areas.  
 
2.1. The  transaction costs 
 
Among the transaction costs, we distinguish the costs of access to the program borne by the 
participants (the laying out of the application folder including the design of a management plan, 
monitoring of the contract compliance) from the administrative costs of FONAFIFO 
functioning (selection, contractualisation, monitoring and fundraising and management).  The 
costs associated to the design of the program are not considered, due to the lack of information 
available.  
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The estimates of access costs to the PESP bear by the participants vary from 12 to 18% of the 
payments total amount according to Miranda et al. (2003). FONAFIFO functioning costs have 
been initially limited by the law in 1996 to 5 % of the PESP budget, and then this limit has 
been raised to 7% in 2003. The program appeared then particularly competitive in controlling 
its costs : according to Ferraro and Kiss (2002), in the USA, administrative costs often 
represent 25% of the budgets of the conservation contracts while in the case of Water 
Conservation Fund in Quito, these costs are estimated between 10 to 20 % of the payments 
channelled through the fund (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). However, the institutional 
transformation of FONAFIFO into a classic public institution made its costs boom since 2008 
to reach 22% of the budget in 2008 (Mendes 2009, interview; Vega 2009, interview)19.  
 
Our analysis shows that transaction costs of the Costa Rican PESP represent some 40% of the 
total amount of the channelled payments, without considering the costs of the program design. 
This amount is higher than the level of transaction costs usually observed in developed 
countries and stands in the highest part of the bracket of the carbon sequestration program’s 
transaction costs in developing countries20 (Wunder, 2007). The PESP costs could be thus 
considered as relatively high since the evolution of FONAFIFO status in 2008. 
 
2.2. The level of payments 
 
                                                 
19 The compliance of Fonafifo to the normative of public sector administration has led to a substantial increase of 
the number of employees in order to perform new tasks required by this status (reporting, internal control,…), as 
well as an increase of labor costs due to mandatory contribution to public pension and social funds. 
20 According to Wunder (2007), the transaction costs of the Canadian program of land diversion represent some 
25% of the total costs while those of the conservation reserve program in the USA are probably lower. The 
transaction costs of the carbon sequestration programs in developing countries vary between 6 and 45 % of the 
payments. 
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Payment per hectare had long been uniform across all contracts within each modality (i.e. forest 
protection; reforestation; natural forest regeneration; agro-forestry systems; forest management) 
but, since 2009, lands with exceptional ecosystem service value receive higher compensation. 
Payments range from roughly 41 US$/ha per year for natural forest regeneration, to a 
cumulative sum of 816 US$/ha for a ten year reforestation (i.e. plantation) contract (Daniels et 
al., 2010). In 1997, the price proposed for the modality of protection, was 45,4 US$/ha per year 
for five year period21 which corresponds to the opportunity costs of the lowest profitable 
alternative use (extensive cattle raising). This amount seems low, when compared to 
opportunity costs of others alternative uses22. Nevertheless, the importance of the demand, 
which is almost three times higher than the possibilities of funding (Rojas and Aylward, 2003), 
shows that it is somehow very attractive. This can be explained by the fact that many of the 
applicants may have conserved their forests anyway. Furthermore, this price has raised due to 
political pressures from the PESP beneficiaries to 64 US$/ha in 2005 and came to a maximum 
of 80 US$/ha for some protection contracts in 2009. As this increase of price was not necessary 
to find a sufficient number of people wishing to participate to the program, the program already 
facing a demand higher than available fundings, we can conclude that it resulted in a decrease 
of the program efficiency (from an economic point of view).  
 
2.3.      The comparison with another conservation scheme, the protected areas 
 
According to Sage (2000) and Hartshorn and al. (2005) the protection cost of the forest 
resources through the PESP is largely lower than the traditional system of land buying by the 
State and protection through a national park (from 1,4 to 4 times less expensive depending on 
                                                 
21 The exchange rate used is from the 31/12/2006. 
22  For example, in the North of the country, landowners are offered 800 US$ per year for the renting of their land 
for pineapple production (Mendes 2009, interview). 
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the hypothesis set23). The PESP costs considered payments levels and administrative costs but 
not access costs, while the national parks’ costs include land buying and parks’ establishment 
and management costs necessary to ensure protection (Sage, 2000). These studies do not 
compare the benefits generated by each scheme, those being considered arbitrarily as equal. 
However, unlike land buying by the State, the PESP requires to be continuously funded and its 
costs may increase overtime with the raise of the opportunity costs of forest protection 
associated with the country’s economic development.  
 
Although the costs of the PESP seem competitive when compared to the costs of the protected 
areas, there is a potential to reduce the PESP costs and thus improve the program efficiency. 
 
3. What potential for improving the PESP efficiency? 
 
3.1. A potential for improvement on the short run… 
 
The improvement of the PES efficiency can be reached through two levers: the improvement of 
its environmental effectiveness and the decrease of its costs.  
 
First, it seems that FONAFIFO functioning costs could be reduced as they have recently 
boomed because of its change of the legal status from a private to public management which 
forced FONAFIFO to increase its numbers of employees and global wage costs and this 
without resulting in an improvement of the program effectiveness. This would imply 
presumably to come back to the previous system where FONAFIFO was managed according to 
the private labor law, which is unlikely. 
                                                 
23 They respectively consider a period of time of 30 and 15 years and discount rate between 6% and 16%. 
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Moreover, according to Pagiola (2008), the lack of targeting and the undifferentiated level of 
payments, which are early characteristics of the program inherited from the former forest 
incentives programs, are  sub-optimal: they don’t allow in fact to generate the maximum of ES 
(through the targeting) at the best cost (through payments adjusted to the opportunity costs of 
beneficiaries). However, improvements have been implemented regarding theses issues with 
the definition since 1999 of targeting criteria and the differentiation of payments since 2009 
within the protection modality24.  
 
Wunscher et al. (2008), using the example of the Nicoya peninsula, estimate that with constant 
budget, the ES production could be doubled. They estimate that the biggest part of the potential 
for efficiency improvement (+93% on a global improvement potential of +105%) come from 
the payments flexibilization to adjust them to the big variations in terms of costs borne by the 
beneficiaries: opportunity costs, transaction costs and the direct costs of implementing the 
measures required in the framework of the protection contracts. This leads to a decrease of the 
average payments’ level. According to them, the use of an ES production index to target the 
lands to be integrated in the program leads to a moderate improvement of the PESP efficiency, 
as the levels of ES generated by different lands are quite similar. Finally the targeting of the 
lands using the deforestation probabilities turns out to be not very attractive because of the low 
variations of the deforestation risk within the region25 (Wunscher et al., 2008).  
  
                                                 
24 In addition to the classical “forest protection” modality for which FONAFIFO pays 64US$/ha/year,  it pays for 
“protection within protected areas” (64 US$/ha/year), “protection of hydrological resources” (80 US$/ha/year) and 
“protection in conservation blanks” (75 US$/ha/year). 
25 The low variations found in the study area between lands in terms of ES generated on the one hand and of 
deforestation risks on the other hand may be higher at the national level. Thus, using these two criteria to target 
PESP participants is probably more promising at the national level to improve the efficiency of the program than 
what found Wunscher et al. (2008) at the Nicoya peninsula level.  
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Nevertheless, the practical implementation of this tool allowing the targeting of the lands 
(according to their deforestation risk and the capacity to generate ES) and the differentiation of 
the payments is facing several challenges: scientific ones (to access a very precise information 
regarding the participation costs of potential beneficiaries, the deforestation risk and the 
capacity to generate ES of the proposed lands), administrative ones (digitalization of 
applications...) but above all political ones (as it could seem unfair26) (Engel et al., 2009). The 
increase of the transaction costs inferred by the implementation of this new tool seems 
negligible27 according to Engel et al. (2009) as they are estimated at 0.27% of the overall 
budget of the program each year.  
 
3.2. … which may reveal itself counterproductive on the long run 
 
If the differentiation of payments and targeting may be considered as options for improving the 
PESP efficiency on the short term, it is necessary to take into account the impacts of these 
options on the social norms and values plus the legitimacy of the program to estimate the 
improvement potential of efficiency on the long term.  
 
Indeed, it is possible to speculate about the impact on social norms and values of the efficiency 
gains resulting from a differentiation of payments that leads to a decrease of payments’ levels. 
In fact, a reduction of current payment may jeopardize the efforts of conscientization of the 
population towards a better valuation of immaterial benefits provided by forests which was one 
of the long term objectives of the PESP (Gonzalez, interview 2009).  Furthermore, according to 
Kosoy et al. (2007), the level of the payments received does not allow in some PES schemes to 
                                                 
26 “In particular, landowners may resist differential payments once homogenous payments have already been 
introduced, as these may be seen as arbitrary discrimination” (Engel et al. 2009). Moreover, favorizing 
landowners that are more prone to deforest may be perceived as inequitable. 
27 They recognize however that FONAFIFO may not share their vision. 
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compensate integrally the opportunity costs of numerous beneficiaries, who nevertheless 
participate to the programs as they would have conserved the forest anyway due to social and 
cultural norms and values. The role of the payment is not to change behaviours, the payments 
being too low to incite the actors prone to deforest not to do it, but rather to reinforce « good 
environmental stewardship ». (Kosoy et al., 2007). This is often the case of the Costa Rican 
PESP (Miranda et al., 2003; Ortiz et al., 2003). However, if the payments were reduced in the 
Costan Rican PESP, they could result counterproductive. As a matter of fact, extrinsic rewards 
can impact negatively on intrinsic motivation (Deci et al., 1999 quoted by Wunder, 2005), such 
as the community’s own interest or the pride derived from forest conservation. This risk seems 
particularly high in the case of payments of small amounts (Heyman and Ariely, 2004, quoted 
by Wunder, 2005) where the efforts in terms of conservation could result lower than in the case 
in which there would be no payment at all.  
 
The same is true for the reconsideration of the egalitarian principle, by which the levels of 
payments are the same whatever the ES values or their provision costs are. If it can allow to 
maximize the efficiency of the PESP on the short term, it can also jeopardize it on the longer 
term as this principle is the pillar of the PESP legitimacy according to Pascual et al. (2009). 
They consider it the « fairness criteria » of the program, that is, according to them, the pillar of 
its legitimacy28. Indeed, some interviewees underline how the Costarican actors have resisted 
the differentiation of payments initiated in 2009, mostly because of pressions from the World 
Bank. 
 
                                                 
28 Pascual and al. (2009) underline that they focus on the distributive effects of the PES on the ES providers, but 
that this analysis could be deepened to include a broader range of actors, in particular ES buyers and ES potential 
providers.  
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Finally, the targeting of the lands according to their deforestation risks (search for additionality) 
can create perverse incentives: channelling payments only towards the landowners that may 
degrade the environment can incite the people to degrade the environment if they are not paid 
for the ES they provide (Wunder, 2005). Some examples at the international level such as the 
case of the PES RISEMP29 project (Pagiola et al., 2004) underline this danger.  
 
The targeting of the lands generating more ES, as proposed by Wunscher et al. (2008) and 
Engel et al. (2009), has already been implemented to some extent by FONAFIFO (but not  
associated with a flexibilization of payments until 2009) and to date their has been no evidence 
of counterproductive effects registered in the literature. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The PESP impact on the forest cover of the country is difficult to demonstrate. It is necessary to 
replace the PESP in the framework of a change in the forest policy of the country, especially 
the prohibition of forested land uses change, for which it has been considered as compensation, 
to assess its likely positive impact on forest cover. Furthermore, the PESP appears to be more 
efficient on the short term than the protected area network, the main alternative tool for 
conservation, at a lower cost. The ES generation potential by lands under contract seems 
relatively satisfactory due to the improvement of the targeting of the lands integrated to the 
program. The PESP appeared also quite competitive regarding the level of transaction costs and 
functioning costs until 2008, before FONAFIFO functioning costs boomed due to its 
institutional transformation. The analysis of the payments’ levels, that appears already quiet 
low in Costa Rica, seems however to show a potential for decrease at first sight. 
                                                 
29 The Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Ecosystem Management Project funded by Global Environment Facility 
aims to promote improved silvopastoral practices in degraded pastures areas through PES mechanisms. It has been 
implemented from 2002 to 2007.  
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A significant potential for improvement of the PESP efficiency exists on the short term, mostly 
through the differentiation of the payments levels or through the targeting of the areas most 
prone to be deforested. Nevertheless, these recommendations do not take into account the 
institutional nature of PESP and the meanings that the stakeholders have given to this program 
and that ensure its legitimacy. In fact, this evolution would oppose some of its founding 
principles (non search of additionnality, same level of payments within each modality...), 
around which the different actors have built its legitimacy. This could jeopardize  the 
program’s viability as Wunder (2007) recognizes : « a PES scheme needs to strike some 
balance between short-term efficiency and fairness, the latter influencing long-run 
conservation viability ». Moreover, these recommendations, by giving priority to a purely 
utilitarian logic, may weaken on the long run the social norms and values impacting forest 
conservation and could eventually reveal themselves counterproductive (Martinez-Allier 2002, 
Vatn 2009). Thus the search for the improvement of the PESP efficiency must take into account 
its potential effects on the long term and consider on the one hand the nature of this 
institutional arrangement in order not to undermine its legitimacy and on the other hand its 
potential impact on social values and norms dealing with conservation. 
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Le programme SERENA traite des enjeux liés à l’émergence de la notion de « service environnemental » dans le domaine des politiques 
publiques concernant le milieu rural. Cette notion prend en compte non seulement la fonction productive des écosystèmes à travers 
l’agriculture, traditionnellement appréhendée par les politiques agricoles, mais aussi d’autres fonctions : régulation, culturelles… 
  
L’objectif du programme SERENA est d’identifier les principes, les mécanismes et les instruments qui facilitent la prise en compte de la 
notion de service environnemental dans les nouveaux dispositifs d’action publique en milieu rural. Il s’agira de mieux comprendre les 
recompositions des politiques publiques et d’être en mesure d’élaborer des recommandations pratiques pour en améliorer la mise en œuvre. 
 
Le programme SERENA, d’une durée de 4 ans (2009-2012), repose sur une analyse comparative internationale (France, Costa-Rica et 
Madagascar) et mobilise environ 40 scientifiques, essentiellement de sciences sociales, issus d’organismes de recherche français (IRD, 
CIRAD, CEMAGREF, CNRS, ENGREF, Université de Montpellier 3, Université de Versailles St Quentin en Yvelines, ENITAC, INRA…). 
 
Les produits du programme SERENA (publications, guides opérationnels, CD Rom, site internet) seront déclinés pour deux publics 
principaux : la communauté scientifique et la communauté des acteurs impliqués dans les politiques environnementales et rurales 
(décideurs, experts, responsables d’organisations de la société civile et du secteur privé…). 
 
 
The SERENA programme deals with issues linked to the emergence of the concept of environmental service in rural public policies. In this 
context, ecosystems managed by agriculture are not only analysed from a traditional productive function perspective but also for their 
regulatory, cultural functions, and thus for the services linked to the maintenance of habitats, biodiversity and landscape. 
 
The overall objective of the SERENA programme is to identify the principles, mechanisms and instruments that enable for an incorporation of 
the environmental service concept in public action for rural areas. Findings help to adjust public policies and to give practical 
recommendations for service provision and management. 
 
The SERENA programme runs for a period of four years (2009-2012), to carry out an international comparative analysis (France, Costa Rica 
and Madagascar). The scientific research team consists of about 40 scientists mainly from social sciences, and from various French 
research institutes (IRD, CIRAD, CNRS, ENGREF, CEMAGREF, University of Montpellier 3, University of Versailles Saint Quentin en 
Yvelines, ENITAC, INRA…). 
 
The outcomes of the SERENA programme are publications, handbooks, CD ROMs and web pages targeting two user groups: the scientific 
community as well as stakeholders and decision-makers involved in environmental and rural policies formulation and implementation 
